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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 Johnson & Johnson and its subsidiary Janssen Biotech, 
Inc. appeal the District Court’s denial of their motion to compel 
arbitration of federal antitrust claims asserted by Rochester 
Drug Cooperative (RDC) on the ground that those claims fall 
within the scope of an agreement to arbitrate all claims “arising 
out of or relating to” a distribution contract between them.  We 
conclude that RDC’s antitrust claims, which allege that 
Johnson & Johnson and Janssen Biotech’s anticompetitive 
conduct caused RDC to pay artificially inflated prices for 
products purchased under the distribution contract, do “arise 
out of or relate to” the distribution contract.  Accordingly, we 
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will reverse and remand for the District Court to refer the 
matter to arbitration.    
I. Background 
 RDC is a direct purchaser and wholesaler of Remicade, 
the brand name of infliximab, which is a “biologic infusion 
drug”1 manufactured by Johnson & Johnson and Janssen 
Biotech (J&J) and used to treat inflammatory conditions such 
as rheumatoid arthritis and Crohn’s disease.  For many years, 
Remicade was the only infliximab drug on the market, but that 
position was threatened when the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) began approving “biosimilars” of 
Remicade—that is, drugs produced by other companies that 
have been deemed by the FDA to have no clinically meaningful 
differences from Remicade.  The thrust of RDC’s allegations 
is that J&J sought to maintain Remicade’s monopoly by 
engaging in an anticompetitive scheme referred to as a 
“Biosimilar Readiness Plan” (Plan), which consisted of, inter 
alia, (1) “[i]mposing biosimilar-exclusion contracts on 
insurers that either [i] require insurers to deny coverage for 
biosimilars altogether or [ii] impose unreasonable 
preconditions . . . governing coverage”; (2) “[m]ulti-product 
bundling of J&J’s Remicade with other J&J drugs, biologics, 
and medical devices”; and (3) “[e]xclusionary agreements and 
bundling arrangements with healthcare providers similar to 
those entered into with insurers.”  JA 100. 
                                                            
1 RDC Br. 3.  A biologic drug is one “derived from 




 To be clear, RDC’s own contractual relationship with 
J&J is limited to a 2015 Distribution Agreement (Agreement),2 
which is not alleged to be part of J&J’s Plan.  The Agreement 
establishes RDC as an “Authorized Distributor of Record” and 
sets out various logistical obligations for its distribution of 
J&J’s pharmaceutical products, including Remicade.  JA 169.  
While the Agreement does not specify an exact purchase price 
for Remicade, it does provide that J&J “will sell Products to 
the Distributor at the applicable Product’s Wholesale 
Acquisition Cost (the ‘WAC’ or ‘List Price’).”  JA 172. 
 The Agreement also contains a “Dispute Resolution” 
term (i.e., arbitration clause), which provides, in pertinent part: 
4.21 Dispute Resolution.  (a) Any controversy or 
claim arising out of or relating to this agreement 
(including without limitation any controversy or 
claim involving the parent company, 
subsidiaries, or affiliates under common control 
of the Company or the Distributor (a 
“Dispute”)), shall first be submitted to mediation 
according to the Commercial Mediation 
Procedures of the American Arbitration 
Association (“AAA”) . . . . 
(b) Any Dispute that cannot be resolved by 
mediation within 45 days . . . shall be resolved 
by arbitration in accordance with the 
Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA . . . 
                                                            
 2 The Agreement was executed between RDC and JOM 
Pharmaceuticals Inc., a J&J entity that handles J&J’s 
distribution contracts.   
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and the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §1 et 
seq. 
JA 188. 
 RDC brought claims under Sections 1 and 2 of the 
Sherman Act based on J&J’s alleged anticompetitive conduct, 
and J&J moved to compel arbitration on the basis that those 
claims “aris[e] out of or relat[e] to” the Agreement.  The 
District Court denied J&J’s motion on the ground that RDC’s 
antitrust claims are not arbitrable because they “are separate 
from, and cannot be resolved based on,” the Agreement.  In re 
Remicade Antitrust Litig., No. 18-cv-00303, 2018 WL 
5314775, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 26, 2018) (alterations in 
original).  In so concluding, the District Court relied heavily on 
this Court’s decision in CardioNet, Inc. v. Cigna Health Corp., 
751 F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 2014), where we explained—in the 
context of a clause providing for arbitration of disputes 
“regarding the performance or interpretation of the 
Agreement”—that whether the plaintiff’s claims were within 
the scope of the clause depended on whether “the claims at 
issue relate to the performance or interpretation of the 
Agreement.”  Id. at 174–75.  Although the arbitration clause in 
this case used significantly broader language, the District Court 
reasoned that RDC’s antitrust claims likewise “did not arise 
from the Agreement [with J&J],” In re Remicade Antitrust 
Litig., 2018 WL 5314775, at *8, because “whether [J&J] 
performed its obligations under the Agreement has no bearing 
on whether it harmed [RDC],” id. (alterations in original) 




 On appeal, the parties dispute (A) as a threshold matter, 
whether federal or state law governs the scope of an agreement 
to arbitrate, and (B) if state law does apply, whether the 
arbitration agreement here, properly interpreted, encompasses 
RDC’s statutory antitrust claims.  We address each issue in 
turn.    
A. The Law Governing the Scope of Arbitration  
 The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) reflects the 
“national policy favoring arbitration and places arbitration 
agreements on equal footing with all other contracts.”  Buckeye 
Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 
(2006); see 9 U.S.C. § 2 (“A written provision in . . . a contract 
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by 
arbitration a controversy . . . arising out of such contract . . . 
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.”).  Because the underlying principle of all arbitration 
decisions is that “arbitration is strictly a matter of consent,” 
                                                            
 3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1331 and 1367(a).  Although there has been no final judgment, 
we have jurisdiction under the Federal Arbitration Act, which 
permits interlocutory appeals from an order denying a motion 
to compel arbitration.  See Zimmer v. CooperNeff Advisors, 
Inc., 523 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008); 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B) 
(providing that an appeal may be taken from an order denying 
a petition to compel arbitration).  “We exercise plenary review 
over questions of law concerning the applicability and scope of 




Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1415 (2019) 
(alterations omitted) (quoting Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters, 
561 U.S. 287, 299 (2010)), the “FAA requires courts to 
‘enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms,’” 
Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1415 (quoting Epic Sys. Corp. v. 
Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1621 (2018)).  But before compelling 
any party to arbitrate pursuant to the FAA, a court must 
consider two “gateway” questions: (1) “whether the parties 
have a valid arbitration agreement at all” (i.e., its 
enforceability), and (2) “whether a concededly binding 
arbitration clause applies to a certain type of controversy” (i.e., 
its scope).  Id. at 1416–17 (citation omitted); see Kirleis v. 
Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., 560 F.3d 156, 160 (3d Cir. 
2009).   
 As we recently observed in Jaludi v. Citigroup, No. 16-
3577, 2019 WL 3558978 (3d Cir. Aug. 6, 2019), “[i]n applying 
state law at step one, we do not invoke the presumption of 
arbitrability.”  Id. at *7 (citations omitted).  “At step two, 
however, ‘in applying general state-law principles of contract 
interpretation to the interpretation of an arbitration agreement 
. . . due regard must be given to the federal policy favoring 
arbitration.’”  Id. (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 
489 U.S. 468, 475 (1989)).  Here, because “the parties do not 
contest the enforceability of the Agreement’s arbitration 
provision,” In re Remicade Antitrust Litig., 2018 WL 5314775, 
at *3, this case turns on step two, that is, whether the alleged 
antitrust violations fall within the scope of the Agreement’s 
arbitration clause providing for arbitration of any “controversy 
or claim arising out of or relating to” the Agreement, JA 188.  
 The parties disagree as to the applicable body of law 
used to interpret the scope of that clause.  While J&J argues 
that it “is a matter of federal law” and the federal presumption 
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in favor of arbitration therefore ends the inquiry, J&J Br. 8–9 
(quoting Century Indem. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at 
Lloyd’s, 584 F.3d 513, 524 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting China 
Minmetals Materials Imp. & Exp. Co. v. Chi Mei Corp., 334 
F.3d 274, 290 (3d Cir. 2003))), RDC contends that courts must 
apply “‘ordinary state law principles to evaluate arbitration 
agreements’ (so long as they do not conflict with the FAA),” 
RDC Br. 18 (quoting MacDonald v. CashCall, Inc., 883 F.3d 
220, 228 (3d Cir. 2018)).  The truth, we conclude, lies 
somewhere in between.  While RDC’s view generally accords 
better with Supreme Court precedent, at least as the starting 
point, see Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1415, we take this 
opportunity to delve into the interplay between state and 
federal law and, in the process, to clarify our Court’s case law.      
 To place our holding today in context, we briefly review 
our case law to date.  Early on, we held that “whether a 
particular dispute is within the class of those disputes governed 
by the arbitration and choice of law clause is a matter of federal 
law.”  Becker Autoradio U.S.A., Inc. v. Becker Autoradiowerk 
GmbH, 585 F.2d 39, 43 (3d Cir. 1978).  But the Supreme Court 
disagreed, holding in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v Kaplan, 
514 U.S. 938 (1995), that “[w]hen deciding whether the parties 
agreed to arbitrate a certain matter (including arbitrability), 
courts generally . . . should apply ordinary state-law principles 
that govern the formation of contracts.”  Id. at 944.  And we 
acknowledged that disagreement in China Minmetals, where 
we observed that under Becker, “federal law applie[d] to the 
interpretation of arbitration agreements,” China Minmetals, 
334 F.3d at 290 (alterations and citations omitted), and then 
“recognized, however, that the Supreme Court in First 
Options stated that a court deciding whether the parties agreed 
to arbitrate a certain matter should apply ‘ordinary state-law 
10 
 
principles governing contract formation,’” id. (citation 
omitted).  
 In China Minmetals, however, we did not have occasion 
to hold that Becker was abrogated because “whether we 
appl[ied] federal law or New Jersey law, the result [was] the 
same.”  334 F.3d at 291.  But in Moon v. Breathless Inc., 868 
F.3d 209 (3d Cir. 2017), the issue was squarely presented, and 
we definitively announced, as to “an arbitration clause’s 
scope,” that “[p]ursuant to the precedent of the Supreme Court 
of the United States, state law applies: ‘When deciding whether 
the parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter (including 
arbitrability), courts generally . . . should apply ordinary state-
law principles that govern the formation of contracts.’”  Id. at 
212–13 (quoting First Options, 514 U.S. at 944). 
 In the case before us today, notwithstanding First 
Options and Moon, J&J insists that an arbitration clause’s 
scope “is a matter of federal law,” so that the federal antitrust 
claims at issue here necessarily fall within the scope of the 
Agreement based on the federal presumption of arbitrability.  
J&J Br. 9 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Century Indem., 584 
F.3d at 524).  J&J’s argument is premised on Century 
Indemnity—an opinion issued between China Minmetals and 
Moon.  There, although we ultimately concluded that the 
arbitration clause was broad enough to include the dispute at 
issue “with or without the [federal] presumption of 
arbitrability,” Century Indem., 584 F.3d at 556, we also stated 
that “the determination of whether ‘a particular dispute is 
within the class of those disputes governed by the arbitration 
clause . . . is a matter of federal law,’” id. at 524 (quoting China 
Minmetals¸ 334 F.3d at 290).   
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 Century Indemnity is not controlling here for three 
reasons.  First, as apparent, the language concerning the 
governance of federal law was ultimately dictum.  It was also 
incomplete.  The quoted language from China Minmetals was 
itself quoting Becker, and we proceeded to then acknowledge 
in the very next sentence that Becker’s approach was contrary 
to that taken by First Options.  Century Indem., 584 F.3d at 
524 (quoting China Minmetals¸ 334 F.3d at 230 (quoting First 
Options, 514 U.S. at 944)).  Yet Century Indemnity quoted only 
the first sentence and omitted the second.  Whether an 
oversight or omission, we must pay heed to intervening 
Supreme Court precedent.  See Karns v. Shanahan, 879 F.3d 
504, 514–15 (3d Cir. 2018). 
 Second, when the choice of state or federal law 
governing the scope of an arbitration clause was squarely 
before us in Moon, we held, relying on First Options, that 
“state law applies” and proceeded to apply it.  Moon, 868 F.3d 
at 213.  We are bound to follow our Circuit’s precedent, so 
Moon is controlling.  See Karns, 879 F.3d at 514 (quoting 3d 
Cir. I.O.P. 9.1). 
 Third, as we also recognized in Moon, “the precedent of 
the Supreme Court of the United States” has made clear that 
state law serves as the baseline for ascertaining an arbitration 
clause’s scope, notwithstanding the fact that federal law may 
also, under certain circumstances, have a role to play.  868 F.3d 
at 212–13; see Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 
559 U.S. 662, 681 (2010) (“While the interpretation of an 
arbitration agreement is generally a matter of state law, the 
FAA imposes certain rules of fundamental importance, 
including the basic precept that arbitration is a matter of 
consent, not coercion.” (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted)); Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 630 
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(2009) (holding that the FAA “creates substantive federal law 
. . . requiring courts to place [arbitration] agreements upon the 
same footing as other contracts,” but that nothing in the FAA 
“purports to alter background principles of state contract law 
regarding the scope of [arbitration] agreements” (internal 
quotation marks citation omitted)).  
 So, what is the role of federal law in interpreting the 
scope of an arbitration agreement?  As we noted in Jaludi, “in 
applying general state-law principles of contract interpretation 
to the interpretation of an arbitration agreement . . . due regard 
must be given to the federal policy favoring arbitration.”  2019 
WL 3558978, at *7 (quoting Volt Info. Scis., 489 U.S. at 475).  
Thus, the federal law favoring arbitration embodied in the FAA 
“provides the default rule” where no state law definitively 
determines whether a given claim is inside or outside the scope 
of an arbitration agreement.  Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1418 
(noting that the Supreme Court “ha[s] repeatedly held that 
ambiguities about the scope of an arbitration agreement must 
be resolved in favor of arbitration” (citations omitted)); 
see White v. Sunoco, Inc., 870 F.3d 257, 262 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(“[T]he presumption of arbitrability applies only where an 
arbitration agreement is ambiguous about whether it covers the 
dispute at hand.  Otherwise, the plain language of the contract 
holds.” (citation omitted)).  And certain general principles of 
federal law apply in resolving that ambiguity, see, e.g., 
Battaglia v. McKendry, 233 F.3d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(noting that this presumption is “particularly applicable where 
the arbitration clause at issue is broad”), and enforcing 
arbitration agreements, see, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian 
Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 233 (2013) (noting that “courts 
must rigorously enforce arbitration agreements according to 
their terms (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).   
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Additionally, federal law may also come into play by 
way of preemption.  For example, federal law will preempt 
otherwise-applicable state law that would invalidate an 
agreement to arbitrate not simply by application of “generally 
applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or 
unconscionability,” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 
U.S. 333, 339 (2011) (quoting Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. 
Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)), but rather because it 
violates the FAA’s so-called “equal-treatment principle”—that 
is, if it “appl[ies] only to arbitration or [] derive[s] [its] meaning 
from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue,” Kindred 
Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1426 
(2017) (citation omitted).  And just this past term, the Supreme 
Court held that a state law rule of contra proferentem was 
preempted to the extent it was used to construe an agreement 
to arbitrate claims on a classwide basis and, thus, to the extent 
it “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution 
of the full purposes and objectives of the FAA.”  Lamps Plus, 
139 S. Ct. at 1416 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 352); accord Stone v. Doerge, 328 
F.3d 343, 345 (7th Cir. 2003) (Easterbrook, J.) (explaining that 
while “most interpretive disputes must be resolved under state 
law,” federal law “does affect . . . the extent to which state law 
may specify special rules for arbitration: any rule of state law 
disfavoring or prohibiting arbitration for a class of transactions 
is preempted” (citation omitted)).   
 In sum, while federal law may tip the scales in favor of 
arbitration where state interpretive principles do not dictate a 
clear outcome, see, e.g., White, 870 F.3d at 262, may displace 
state law through preemption, see, e.g., Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. 
at 1416, or may inform the interpretive analysis in other ways, 
see, e.g., Battaglia, 233 F.3d at 725; Am. Express, 570 U.S. at 
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233, applicable state law governs the scope of an arbitration 
clause—as it would any other contractual provision—in the 
first instance.4  We therefore turn to the question of the scope 
of the arbitration clause before us, looking to the applicable 
state law—that of New Jersey.5   
B. The Scope of the Agreement’s Arbitration 
Clause 
 When it comes to ascertaining the scope of an 
arbitration provision, New Jersey “[c]ourts have generally read 
the terms ‘arising out of’ or ‘relating to’ [in] a contract as 
                                                            
 4 Indeed, it would not be practicable, as J&J posits, to 
apply state law when it comes to the enforceability or validity 
of an arbitration provision (i.e. at step one), but to exclusively 
apply federal law when it comes to interpreting the provision’s 
scope (i.e. step two), particularly given how easily arguments 
pertaining to scope can be repackaged in terms of 
enforceability.  See Oral Argument at 33:52-34:41 (RDC 
arguing that, whether viewed as a question of enforceability or 
scope, “we end up in the same place” because “if this 
agreement is construed to cover our antitrust claims, it is 
unenforceable”).  
 
 5 The Agreement states only that “the arbitrator” (e.g., 
not the courts) “must interpret any dispute arising out of or 
relating to this agreement in accordance with the laws of New 
Jersey,” JA 188, and does not make explicit that the law of New 
Jersey governs interpretation of the contract generally.  
Nonetheless, as the parties proceed on that assumption, so do 
we.  See Moon, 868 F.3d at 213 (assuming without deciding 
that the state law on which the parties agreed applied to the 
interpretation of an arbitration clause). 
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indicative of an ‘extremely broad’ agreement to arbitrate any 
dispute relating in any way to the contract.”  Curtis v. Cellco 
P’ship, 992 A.2d 795, 802 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) 
(alterations in original) (citations omitted).  “Such broad 
clauses have been construed to require arbitration of any 
dispute between the contracting parties that is connected in any 
way with their contract.”  Id. (citations omitted).  
 Consistent with that approach, the New Jersey 
Appellate Division has held that the phrase “[a]ny other 
unresolved disputes arising out of this Agreement” 
encompasses antitrust claims challenging allegedly 
anticompetitive conduct that resulted in overcharges based on 
the underlying contract.  EPIX Holdings Corp. v. Marsh & 
McLennan Cos., 982 A.2d 1194, 1199, 1204 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2009), overruled in part on other grounds by Hirsch 
v. Amper Fin. Servs., 71 A.3d 849 (N.J. 2013).  Relying on the 
Second Circuit’s similar reasoning in JLM Indus., Inc. v. Stolt–
Nielsen, S.A., 387 F.3d 163, 178 (2d Cir. 2004), the Appellate 
Division explained that “the claims the . . . defendants seek to 
arbitrate not only ‘arise out of’, but are undeniably intertwined 
with the contract . . . since it is the fact of [plaintiff’s] entry into 
the contract containing the allegedly inflated price and other 
oppressive terms that gives rise to the claimed injury.”  EPIX 
Holdings Corp., 982 A.2d at 1207.  And on that basis, the court 
found it “difficult to conceive how plaintiff could maintain its 
claim for damages without reference to, and reliance upon, the 
underlying contract.”  Id.; see Pop Test Cortisol, LLC v. Merck 
& Co., Inc., A-5403-12T4, 2014 WL 1660605, at *1, *6 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 28, 2014) (applying EPIX and 
holding that an arbitration provision applying to “[a]ll disputes 
arising out of or relating to this Agreement” encompassed state 
statutory claims and federal RICO claims).   
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That reasoning applies equally here, where the 
gravamen of RDC’s complaint is that J&J’s anticompetitive 
Plan “enabled [it] to sell its branded Remicade infliximab 
product at artificially inflated prices,” JA 132, and the only 
“inflated price[]” that could have caused RDC’s injury was the 
price it paid J&J for Remicade, i.e., the WAC or list price 
provided in the Agreement, JA 172.  Thus, RDC’s antitrust 
claims are “undeniably intertwined” with the Agreement 
because “it is the fact of [RDC’s] entry into the [Agreement] 
containing the allegedly inflated price . . . that gives rise to the 
claimed injury.”6  EPIX Holdings Corp., 982 A.2d at 1207; see 
also JLM Indus., Inc., 387 F.3d at 173, 176 (holding antitrust 
claims “aris[e] out of” contracts where the “central factual 
allegations of the complaint” involve “a core issue of the 
contracts between the parties—allegations that the price terms 
set forth in those contracts have been artificially inflated as a 
result of the [anticompetitive conduct]” of the defendants); 
S+L+H S.p.A. v. Miller–St. Nazianz, Inc., 988 F.2d 1518, 1524 
                                                            
 6 J&J also argues that two later provisions in the 
“Dispute Resolution” section expand the universe of arbitrable 
issues beyond those “arising out of or related to” the 
Agreement: namely, portions of subsection (d) providing that 
“EACH PARTY IRREVOCABLY WAIVES ITS RIGHT TO 
TRIAL OF ANY ISSUE BY JURY,” and limiting an 
arbitrator’s award of enhanced damages, interest, or attorneys’ 
fees “EXCEPT AS MAY BE REQUIRED BY STATUTE.”  
J&J Br. 19 (quoting JA 188).  The District Court rejected that 
argument, explaining that the structure of the “Dispute 
Resolution” section indicates that those provisions refer only 
to “claims otherwise encompassed by [subsection (a)],” In re 
Remicade Antitrust Litig., 2018 WL 5314775, at *5, and we 
agree.   
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(7th Cir. 1993) (observing that a claim “that draws its very 
essence from the fact of and performance under the 
[Agreement] in question . . . necessarily is a claim that arises 
out of and relates to the Agreement” (first alteration in original) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).   
 RDC contends that ascertaining the scope of the 
arbitration clause by considering whether “the claim[s] would 
not exist” except for the Agreement, RDC. Br. 36, contravenes 
this Court’s recent admonition against “equat[ing] the meaning 
of ‘arising out of’ with the concept of but-for causation,” 
Reading Health Sys. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 900 F.3d 87, 100 
n.59 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Omron Healthcare, Inc. v. 
Maclaren Exports Ltd., 28 F.3d 600, 602 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(“‘Arising out of’ and ‘arising under’ are familiar phrases, and 
courts have resisted the siren call of collapsing them to but-for 
causation.”)).  But we are not swayed by the fact that RDC’s 
antitrust claims could not exist but-for the Agreement; what is 
dispositive is that they cannot be adjudicated without 
“reference to, and reliance upon,” it.7  EPIX Holdings Corp., 
982 A.2d at 1207.   
                                                            
 7 By contrast, many of the cases on which RDC relies 
(none of which are binding on this Court) involve antitrust 
claims that the court could “resolve . . . without reference to 
the agreement containing the arbitration clause.”  NCR Corp. 
v. Korala Assocs., Ltd., 512 F.3d 807, 814 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(emphasis added); see also AlliedSignal, Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich 
Co., 183 F.3d 568, 573 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that antitrust 
claims alleging supracompetitive prices were not arbitrable 
because the underlying contract, “though it d[id] provide for 
shared information and cooperation, d[id] not regulate the price 
[defendant] may charge”).  In any event, to the extent there 
18 
 
And even if RDC’s inevitable reliance on the 
Agreement to prove injury were not enough to render its claims 
“arising out of” the Agreement, they need only “relat[e] in any 
way to the [Agreement]” to be “related to” it.  Curtis, 992 A.2d 
at 802 (citation omitted).  “An arbitration provision covering 
claims ‘relating to’ a contract is broader than one which covers 
claims merely arising out of a contract.”  Yale Materials 
Handling Corp. v. White Storage & Retrieval Sys., Inc., 573 
A.2d 484, 486 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (citation 
omitted).  New Jersey courts have interpreted the term 
“relating to” in the arbitration clause context to be “extremely 
broad,” Angrisani v. Fin. Tech. Ventures, L.P., 952 A.2d 1140, 
1146 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008), which we understand 
to mean—as we have held in the forum selection clause 
context—that a claim need only have “some ‘logical or causal 
connection’” to the agreement to be related to it,  John Wyeth 
& Bro. Ltd v. Cigna Int’l Corp., 119 F.3d 1070, 1074 (3d Cir. 
1997) (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 
1916 (1971)).  Here, we have no difficulty finding that RDC’s 
antitrust claims “relate to” the Agreement, which sets the drug 
prices and governs the commercial relationship between the 
parties.   
 RDC argues, in the alternative, that even if the 
arbitration provision is broad enough to encompass RDC’s 
antitrust claims, the claims are nonetheless outside the scope 
of the Agreement because the provision fails to comply with 
New Jersey’s rule of contractual interpretation requiring 
waivers of constitutional or statutory rights to be stated “clearly 
and unambiguously.”  Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., 99 
                                                            
may be tension between those holdings and that of the Second 
Circuit in JLM, New Jersey courts to date have embraced the 
latter.  See EPIX Holdings Corp., 982 A.2d at 1207. 
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A.3d 306, 309 (N.J. 2014).  Underlying New Jersey’s rule is 
the notion that agreements to arbitrate, “like any other contract, 
must be the product of mutual assent,” id. at 312–13 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted), and because “an average 
member of the public may not know—without some 
explanatory comment—that arbitration is a substitute for the 
right to have one’s claim adjudicated in a court of law,” id. at 
313, arbitration clauses will not be construed to encompass 
constitutional or statutory rights absent some “concrete 
manifestation” of the intention to do so, Garfinkel v. 
Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., 773 A.2d 665, 
672 (N.J. 2001); see Moon, 868 F.3d at 214–15 (interpreting 
the rule as requiring an arbitration clause to contain three 
components: “First, it must identify the general substantive 
area that the arbitration clause covers”; “Second, it must 
reference the types of claims waived by the provision”; “Third, 
it must explain the difference between arbitration and 
litigation”).  
 While the New Jersey Supreme Court has not 
definitively resolved the scope of the rule, it has applied it thus 
far only in the context of employment and consumer contracts.  
See Kernahan v. Home Warranty Adm’r of Fla., Inc., 199 A.3d 
766, 784 (N.J. 2019) (consumer); Atalese, 99 A.3d at 312–13 
(N.J. 2014) (consumer); Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 800 A.2d 
872, 883 (N.J. 2002) (employment); Garfinkel, 773 A.2d at 
665 (employment); see also Moon, 868 F.3d at 214–15 
(employment).  Moreover, in its most recent discussion of the 
rule, the New Jersey Supreme Court emphasized that “the 
consumer context of the contract [in Atalese] mattered,” 
Kernahan, 199 A.3d at 777, and that the “twin concerns” 
animating its application of the rule there were that (1) “a 
consumer is not necessarily versed in the meaning of law-
20 
 
imbued terminology about procedures tucked into form 
contracts” (as opposed to “individually negotiated” ones), and 
that (2) “plain language explanations of consequences had 
been required in contract cases in numerous other settings 
where a person would not be presumed to understand that what 
was being agreed to constituted a waiver of a constitutional or 
statutory right,” id.  Neither concern applies to J&J and RDC’s 
Agreement.  
 Even before Kernahan’s strong intimation that the rule 
applies only where the parties have unequal bargaining power 
and levels of sophistication—as in the employment and 
consumer contexts—the New Jersey Appellate Division has 
held on several occasions that the rule “d[oes] not extend . . . 
to commercial contracts,” i.e., contracts that resulted “from a 
lengthy negotiation process” and where no party was an 
“average member[] of the public.”8  Victory Entm’t, Inc. v. 
Schibell, No. A-3388-16T2, 2018 WL 3059696, at *8 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. June 21, 2018) (citation omitted); see also 
Columbus Circle N.J., LLC v. Island Constr. Co., No. A-1907-
15T1, 2017 WL 958489, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 
13, 2017) (rejecting application of Atalese to the contract at 
issue, which was not “a consumer contract of adhesion where 
[one party] . . . possessed superior bargaining power and was 
the more sophisticated party” (alteration in original) (citation 
omitted)); Gastelu v. Martin, No. A-0049-14T2, 2014 WL 
10044913, at *6 & n.4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 9, 2015) 
                                                            
 8 Where an unanswered question of New Jersey law 
requires us to “predict how the Supreme Court of [New Jersey] 
would decide the question,” we give “due regard” to decisions 
of the intermediate appellate courts.  Specialty Surfaces Int’l, 




(“Parties to a commercial contract can express their intention 
to arbitrate their disputes rather than litigate them in court, 
without employing any special language . . . .  In the present 
case . . . we are dealing with commercial business transaction 
[sic] and, therefore, the standard is not as stringent [as the one 
put forward in Atalese].”).   
 Here, there is no dispute that the Agreement is a 
commercial contract or that both J&J and RDC are “highly 
sophisticated participant[s] in the pharmaceutical market,” J&J 
Br. 27, as opposed to “average member[s] of the public,” 
Atalese, 99 A.3d at 312.  Taking into account the illustrative 
statements in Kernahan, and affording “due regard” to the 
decisions of the intermediate appellate courts declining to 
extend the rule to commercial contracts, Specialty Surfaces, 
609 F.3d at 237, we conclude that the rule does not apply to the 
Agreement between J&J and RDC in any event, and thus does 
not narrow the scope of the arbitration provision.   
 Because we conclude that the rule does not apply here, 
we need not address whether the Agreement’s arbitration 
clause satisfies it or, if it does not, whether notwithstanding the 
New Jersey Supreme Court’s statement in Atalese that the rule 
is “not specific to arbitration provisions,” 99 A.3d at 313, it 
would be preempted—either because it is “too tailor-made to 
arbitration agreements . . . to survive the FAA’s edict against 
singling out those contracts for disfavored treatment,” Kindred 
Nursing Ctrs., 137 S. Ct. at 1427, or because it “interferes with 
fundamental attributes of arbitration,” Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. 
at 1418.9   
                                                            
 9 We note that the New Jersey Supreme Court may 
address this issue in Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc., 202 A.3d 1 (N.J. 
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 Accordingly, because RDC’s antitrust claims “aris[e] 
out of or relate[] to” the Agreement, they must be arbitrated.      
III. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the judgment 
of the District Court and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  
                                                            
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2019), certif. granted, C-922 Sept. Term 
2018, 2019 WL 2403144 (N.J. June 3, 2019); see also 
Kernahan, 199 A.3d at 786 (Albin, J., concurring) (explaining 
that New Jersey requires “that an arbitration clause must 
simply explain to the average consumer what it forecloses . . . 
[and] do[es] not discriminate against an arbitration agreement 
by requiring it to [explain its purpose]”); Atalese, 99 A.3d at 
313–14 (giving examples of the New Jersey “clear and 
unmistakable” requirement being applied in various non-
arbitration contexts). 
